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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Al~n N. Resnick**

closes and sells the collateral. does
the guarantor have a statutory right
to notice of the collateral sale despite the waiver of such notice in the
guaranty agreement? This question
was addressed recently by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
In re Kirkland. 1

RELEASING GUARANTOR BY
FAILING TO GIVE NOTICE-THE
DANGER OF RELYING ON
PREDEFAUL T WAIVERS

Commercial credit agreements
are often secured by the debtor's
property and also supported by one
or more guarantors. The security
interest in the debtor's property benefits the guarantor as well as the
lender because it increases the likelihood that the lender will be compen~ated from funds realized by the
sale of the collateral. Therefore, in
the event of default and foreclosure,
the guarantor could be adversely
affected by an improper sale of collateral that results in an unreasonably low price.
r
In order to avoid disputes and
defenses regarding ·adequate notice
of the collateral sale, it is common
for the guaranty agreement to contain the guarantor's waiver of the
right to all notices. If a debtor defaults and the secured lender fore-

Facts of the Case
On September 16, 1980, Security
Pacific National Bank had entered
into a credit agreement with Cascade Oil Co., of which Mr. Kirkland was president !ind a majority
stockholder. The credit.agreement
provided for a revolving note and
established a $1.25 miiijbn unsecured lin~? of credit and an a1:rditiomil
$200,000 line of credit. Mr. and
Mr~. Kirkland also gave 'security
Pactfic an unsecured general continuing guaranty of Cascade's credit
line. The,guaranty waived all notices and gave Security Pacific the
power to substitute, release,. decrease, or alter any collateral.
Cascade Oil defaulted on March
31, 1981, and on May 20, 1981,
as part of a workout agreement,
Cascade Oil gave Security Pacific a
security interest in certain of its real
and personal property. Security Pacific waived the default through
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May29, 1981. By a letter agreemenf
dated May 18, 1981, the Kirklands
as guarantors consented to the collateralization of Cascade Oil's loan.
The letter agreement provided that
the collateralization of Cascade
Oil's loan "does not affect or diminish'' the Kirklands' obligation under the continuing guaranty of September 16, 1980. 2 ,However, the
repayment proposed under this
workout agreement was not accepted by Security. National, and the
Cascade Oil obligation reverted to
default status.
In a second workout arrangement, Security Pacific agreed t!l a
six-month moratorium on Cascade
Oil's obligation and obtained security for the Kirklands' previously
unsecured guaranty consisting of a
deed of trust on the Kirkland,s' California ranches and a security interest in Mr. Kirkland's partnership
interest in an apartment complex.
The agreement also provided that
the September 16, 1980, continuing
guaranty ''shall also remain in full
force and effect. " 3
The six months' moratorium
passed, and Cascade Oil again failed
to mak~ payment. On May 7, 1982,

Cascade filed a chapter 11 petition ..
Subsequently, Mr. Kirkland resigned as president. The new Cascade president, in August and September 1983, sold two pieces of
equipment, one for $4,500 and the
other for $55,000, either with the
consent or at the direction of Security Pacific. The Kansas bankruptcy
court found these sales to be commercially reasonable, but the Kirklands were not given notice of the
sales and first learned about them
after they took place.
The Kirklands filed for chapter 11
relief in 1985, and Security Pacific
filed its proof of claim based on the
guaranty. The Kirklands objected
to the claim on the grounds that
Security Pacific had not given the
Kirklands notice of the sale of the
collateral and that, therefore, the
Kirklands' liability on the guaranty
for any deficiency had become unenforceable.

Guarantors Are "Debtors~'
The bankruptcy court granted the
Kirklands' motion for summary
judgment, holding that guarantors
are "debtors" for the purpose of
applying the notice requirements of
the California version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) ..
Section 9105(1)(d) of the California
Commercial Code provides:

1

The court stated: "The Kirklands note
that this letter agreement did not use
the words 'waiver,' 'renunciation,' or
'notice' and makes no other reference
to the September 16, 1980, guaranty
agreement."
!d. at 1237 n.2.
3 The court stated: "Again, the Kirklands note that the letter agreement did
not contain the words 'waiver,' 'renunciation,' or 'notice.' ''
!d. at 1238 n.3.

"Debtor" means the person who
owes payment or other performance
of the obligation secured, whether or
not he or she owns or has rights in
the collateral, and includes the seller
of accounts or chattel paper. Where
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the debtor and the owner of the collateralare not the same person, "debtor" me4ns the owner of the collat~ral
in any provision of [Article fJ of the
California Codef dea1ing with the
collatenil,_-the o-bligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and
may include both where the context
so requires:

As "debtors," the Kirklands
were entitled to the notice requirements of Section 9504(3) of the California Commercial· Code, which
provides, in part, that "[u]nlesscollateral is perishable or threatens to
decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, the secured party
must give to the debtor, if he has
not signed after default a~ statement
renouncing or modifying his· right
tu notification of sale, ... :tnotice
in writing oi the time and place of
any public sale or of the time on or
after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made.''
The section then goes on to provide
with particularity the requirements
regaidiQg the time and manner of
the notice.
Accordingly, the b~nkruptcy
court held that, as a matter of law,
the Kirklands could not have· waiveo
thejr rights to noti~e prior to default.
''The [ban~ruptcy] court also deter-,
mined that ihere was no post-defau)J:
waiver because th~ letter agreements subsequ_ent to the initial default--constituted ,a novation of the
Kirklands' original obligation. '' 4
Since notice -of th_e sale was not
• /d. at 1238.
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given subsequeflt t9 defaul~, the
bankruptcy court disallowed the deficiency claim which exceeded $1.3
million.
The bankruptcy court's decision
was upheld by the bankruptcy appellate panel5 and was affirmed by the
court of appeals. 6 The court of ap-·
peals agreed with the conclusion of
the bankruptcy appellate panel that
''even if the letter agreements incorporated the terms of the continuing
guaranty by reference, Cascade's·
repeated failure to make payments
constituted separate defaults, not
one continuous default. Therefore,
the waivers of ·notice, if any, occurred prior to, not after, the last
default.' ' 7
Standard of Review
The court of appeal~ noted that
the standard to review a lower
court's decision granting summary
judgment is r.eviewed de novo. Similarly, the col!rt of appeals observed
that an interpretation of state law
was likewise reviewed de novo.
Since there was no decision by the
state's highest court, the court of
appeals lield:
[A] federal court must predict how
the highest state court would decide
the issue using intermediate appellate
court decisions, decisions from other
jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and
restatements as guidance .... However, "in the absence of convincing
5
In re Kirkland, 91 Bankr.-551 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1988).
6
915 F.2d at 1236.
7
/d. at 1238.
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evidence that the highest-court of the
state would decide differently, ... ''
a federal court is obligated to follow
the decisions of the state's intermediate courts. 8 ,

Court of California would decide
this issue was not an exact science,
two facts bolstered its conclusion.
First, the major.ity of California
courts had repudiated the course initially set by Rutan, and in light of the
.most recent cases, ,., RutatJ would be
a slim reed upon which to rest a
contrary decision." 11 Second, the
more recent cases had "brought
California within the majority of
states which had determined that a
guarantor is a debtor for the purpose
of section 9105(1)(d) [of the Uniform Commercial Code] and afforoed the notice protection of section 9504(3). " 12
The court of appeals, having decided that a guarantor is entitled to
notice of the manner in which the
' collateral will be sold, turned to the
final issue of whether the Kirklands
did in fact waive t~eir right to such
notice after default as required by
Section 9504(3). 13 Security Pacific

Tpe court of appeals turned to the
Supreme Court of California for an
answer to the issue of whether a
guarantor was a debtor, but no such
decision could be found. The court
of appeals then turned to the decisions of the Court of Appeals of
California. Three of the most recent
deci,sions of the highest state court
thal decided this issue had held that
the guarantor was a debtor for the
purposes of Section 9105(1)(d) of
the California €ommercial Code
and was entitled to the protection of
Section 9504(3)9 ; a fourth decision,
Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc. , 10
reached the opposite conclusion.
In construing California law, the
court of appeals felt bound by the
interpretation adopted by the majority of California state appellate
coui;ts. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's
dete,rmination that, for purposes of
Section 9105(1)(d), a guarantor was
a debtor and was afforded the protection provided in Section 9504(3).
Although the court admitted that
pre4icting the way that the Supreme

11

In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d at 1240.
ld. In footnote 6 (citations omitted),
the court of appeals rejected another interesting argument:
Security Pacific contends that in adopting
a stricter version of § 9504(3) the Cali(ornia legislature could have, but did not,
include guarantors within that statute's
provisions; Californill's adoption of a
stricter version of § 9504(3) is of no
consequence to our decision. In adopting
a stricter version of§ 9504(3), the California legislature. s apparent concern was
not who was to be given notice, but the
way in which notice should be given.
/d. at 1240 n.6 (citations omitted).
L' The court stated: "Both parties assume, as do we, that a default by the
debtor is the event used to determine
whether a waiver of notice by"the guaran-,
tor is post-default.'<
/d. at 1241 n.8.
12

• ld. at 1239.
• See American Nat'! Bank. v. PermaTile Roof Co., 200 Cal. App. 3d 889, 246
Cal. Rptr. 381 (1988); C.l.T. Corp. v. Anwright Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 237
Cal. Rptr. 108 (1987); Connolly v. Bank of
Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119,
229 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1986).
10
173 Cal. App. 3d 965, 219 Cal. Rptr.
381 (1985).
I
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the only waiver of notice that would
have been effective would have been
one executed after September 15,
1981,.the date of the only relevant
default. No such waiver existed. 15

argued that "the Kirklands did, in
fact, waive their right to notice after
Cascade's default in both their May
18, 1981 and June 8, 1981 letter
agreements because both letter
agreements incorporated the terms
of the Kirklands' original guaranty.'' 14 Security Pacific took the position that Section 9504(3) requires
that notice be waived "after default" but not that the debtor has
to be "in default" when notice is
waived. Accordingly, Security Pacific argued that, since the guarantors waived their right to notice after
March 31, 1981, the date of the
debtor's initial default, Section
9504(3) had been satisfied.
The court responded to this argument by observing that the debtor
defaulted at three separate times: in
March 1981, in May 1-981, and in
September 1981:

A Costly Mistake

After each of these defaults, with the
exception of September 15, 1981,
Security Pacific waived the default
and had executed in its favor additional security from both Cascad!!
and the Kirklands. Therefore, even
if we assume that the letter agreementsofMayandJune 1981 incorporated the terms of the Kirklands'
original guaranty and that § 9504(3)
requires only that a debtor waive
notice "after default" and not while
"in default," Security Pacific violated§ 9504(3).
Prior to September 15, 1981, in'effect, Cascade had not defaulted beciluse Security Pacific waived default
for additional security. As a result,
14

The court of appeals observed
that California courts traditionally
disallowed deficiency claims when
a creditor failed to adhere to the
notice requirements of Section
9504(3). Security Pacific argued
that the court should not apply the
absolute bar rule, which is ''meant
to prevent unreasonable, not commercially reasonable, disp!)sitions
of collateral, particularly when, as
here, the guarantors incur no damage.'' 16 The court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that the
California courts had consistently
adhered to a simple maxim: "[l]f
the secured creditor wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey the
law. If he does not obey the law, he
may not have his deficiency judgment, ... regardless of the commercial reasonableness of the creditor's
conduct. " 17
The court also pointed out that
California courts do not allow a
secured creditor's substantial compliance or good faith to mitigate
the severity of disallowance of the
entire deficiency claim. California
courts do not require the debtor to
show injury; instead, the burden of
proving compliance with the nolice
·~/d.

'"Jd.
17
/d. at 1242.

ld. at 1241.
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requirements 6f the utc is placed
on the secured creditor.
Conclusion
The',Kirkiand decision serves as
an important reminder to secured
creditors to comply strictly with' the
requirements of Article 9 of the
UCC and especially to treat guarantors as "debtors" for notice pur~
poses. Although guaranties often

contain various waivers, including
a waiver of notice of the sale of
collateral, the practitioner should
not blindly rely on the validity or
unrestricted application of those
waivers. The decision also illustrates how the requirement that a
waiver of notice of a collateral sale
be executed after default cah be misleading in the common· scepario involving sev~ral successive defaults
and restructurings.
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